Liberalism and Human Flourishing

7. Conclusion

My account shows how liberalism, in its emphasis on individual freedom over individual need and social responsibility, elevation of self-interest and neglect of altruism, attachment to private ownership, faith in the efficacy of markets and distrust of the state, permits a host of ills. The demonstrable effects are concentrated wealth, leading to abuses of power and stagnating economies; wretched poverty for many, with lives bereft of opportunity and hope; and markets which malfunction, characterised by boom and bust, monopoly and environmental destruction.

Examination of these liberal precepts reveals defects in assumptions, argument and emphasis. Both Nozick and Rawls exalt liberties, but do not adequately justify the absence of positive rights based on needs. Nozick's absolutism permits coercive exploitation and is indifferent to consequences. Extensive rights attached to private ownership are not justified by liberal accounts of property acquisition and transfer. Nozick's arguments against redistribution and for a minimal state are flawed. Rawls ensures some benefit reaches the least well-off, but not enough to prevent inequality increasing. Liberals wish to limit the state's oppressive potential, but fail to see its potential for good.

A new philosophy is required. The one I propose makes no questionable claims to moral objectivity; instead it is well founded on a practical morality that reflects our natural self-interest and altruism. The right and the good are interdependent. Rights and outcomes are ranked according to their contribution to human flourishing. These ensure everyone has the material conditions for opportunity and exercise of rights. Education is crucial to personal fulfilment. Non-private forms of property ownership are advocated where socially beneficial. Progressive taxation redistributes wealth and finances an active state, which implements the measures needed.

Liberalism accommodates so many variants, it might seem that I am proposing just another. My philosophy owes much to Rawls, in ideas such as fairness and primary goods, and to other liberal philosophers, but in some ways is closer to socialism, in its approach to ownership and redistribution. Yet it is new in not being bound to any existing ism and in having its own ethical foundations. Its central aim is to improve social well-being and individual lives; all else serves that. Marx, through his philosophy, sought to change the world. Learning from the past, we should not be discouraged from developing a philosophy for the future, of the sort discussed here, that contributes towards a world where everyone can flourish.

© 2018 C P Blundred