Liberalism and Human Flourishing

1. Introduction

1.1. Thesis

Liberalism is not sufficiently concerned with, or is opposed to, securing the material conditions and taking the positive steps necessary for people and society to flourish. This inadequacy arises from questionable or mistaken assumptions, argument and emphasis. A more humane political philosophy is both required and achievable.

1.2. Argument Outline

Any political philosophy concerned with maintaining a stable, well run society, whose members are to have a realistic possibility of reasonably fulfilled lives, should give serious attention to the material conditions of life. These involve not just physical necessities, but also education and other goods needed for persons to progress economically and socially. Beyond that, they cover the distribution of resources and proceeds in a society and the way economic activities are organised. This is not to argue that materialistic concerns are ultimately the most important, in the sense of being closest to our highest goals, but they are the most urgent. Without sufficient material goods and opportunity most members of society have little chance of formulating, let alone attaining, higher goals.

There are many ways of living well, but that is not to say there are no common features worth pursuing or no common pitfalls to be avoided. Active intervention is sometimes required to overcome the circumstances in which many people find themselves. The political philosophy, then, might endorse public involvement in people's lives, if that would enable them to flourish.

The most fully worked-out liberal theory, John Rawl's Theory of Justice (1999), is perhaps the most persuasive against my thesis, so it is worth examining its economic arguments closely as well as its fundamental principles. The libertarianism of Robert Nozick as expressed in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1996) is the most opposed to the ideas behind the thesis, so that deserves special attention too. The most favourable arguments to my thesis are those of John Mackie (1977), James Sterba (2002), James Grunebaum (1987), the psychologist Derek Wright (1975), the economist Thomas Picketty (2014) and the sociologist Andrew Sayer (2016).

Overall, as the form of the thesis suggests, the supporting line of argument is three-pronged:

  1. it aims to show how adverse economic and social consequences flow from or are not prevented by liberal tenets;
  2. it seeks to expose flaws in the derivation of these tenets;
  3. it sketches a political philosophy that deals with the problems revealed in (i) and (ii).

The first prong, in chapter 2, examines liberal ideas and their possible adverse economic and social consequences. It draws on real-world empirical evidence to determine if these consequences have actually transpired. This is a quick overview rather than a detailed account, as the emphasis in the dissertation is on philosophy rather than economics. Following the references will provide interested readers with further information.

The second prong, in chapters 3 and 4, exposes inadequate foundations and flawed arguments in key areas of liberal philosophy. Critical attention is given to rights, property ownership, distributive justice and the role of the state. Chapter 3 contains the following arguments:

  1. Nozick follows Locke in ascribing rights to natural law, but does not provide further justification for the rights despite building his political philosophy upon them.
  2. Nozickean rights are absolute and inviolate, so, to avoid conflicts, counter-rights are arbitrarily excluded and coercion narrowly defined. This allows exploitation and terrible consequences.
  3. Rawlsian rights are rooted in a social contract, but it is arguable which rights would arise from that contract. Their priority over the good overlooks that minimal part of the good without which the rights cannot be exercised.
  4. Extensive property rights rest upon legitimate ownership. The libertarian account of legitimate property acquisition and transfer does not pass scrutiny. Other liberals are unquestioning in accepting conventions on property ownership.

From these, I conclude that rights should be well founded, not absolute, not exclusive of counter-rights and not followed without any regard to outcomes. The questionable priority of liberties over needs, leads to a case for positive rights. Failure to provide an adequate account of legitimate property ownership brings into question the exclusivity of property rights. These permit a radical rethink on inequality.

In chapter 4, the arguments are:

  1. Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice not only rests upon shaky foundations of ownership and rights, but relies on a failed argument against patterned distributions.
  2. Although Rawls’ difference principle ensures that the least advantaged benefit from any inequality, it does not prevent a widening of the gap between them and the most advantaged.
  3. Taxation is an important means to redistributive justice. Nozick’s forced-labour argument fails. Rawls prefers proportional over progressive taxation, but this is inadequate and less fair.
  4. Nozick advocates a minimal state, but the account of its formation from anarchy reveals defects. The expanded state of Rawls and others is limited by undue concerns over oppression and interference, making it ineffective in dealing with (i).

From these, I conclude that patterned distributions may not be unjustified. Rawls' difference principle is not enough to tackle inequality. Taxation can be used to reduce inequality, without being oppressive. A more active state is both required and justifiable.

The third prong, in chapters 5 and 6, attempts to provide better foundations upon which a political philosophy can be constructed, paying due regard to the conditions needed for individual and social well-being. In chapter 5, the arguments proceed as follows:

  1. A political morality is better founded, without any claim to moral objectivity, on a practical, personal morality that reflects our egoistic and self-referentially altruistic nature. In translating to a consensual political philosophy, a general, impartial benevolence remains.
  2. Deontological and teleological approaches are interdependent. A political philosophy should use both approaches. The blurred distinction between the right and the good suggests a nuanced approach to conflict resolution.
  3. What constitutes human flourishing is found by asking what is most urgent to our existence. If flourishing matters most to us personally, then it must have primacy in our political philosophy. High-priority positive rights secure the material conditions for living.
  4. From (b) (and (a)), the right, should not have automatic priority over the good, rather, from (c) (and (a)), conflicting claims should be ranked according to what best serves human flourishing.
  5. Rights over larger holdings become incrementally weaker, so either non-owners should have more property rights or more property becomes communally owned. This has correspondences with autonomous ownership, but here human flourishing is the basis.

Thus, from a practical morality reflecting our nature, a political morality is constructed, featuring a significant, impartial benevolence. This sets the level at which the philosophy can achieve human flourishing. The right and the good are interdependent, so rights and outcomes are ranked together. Greater communal rights over property are required.

In chapter 6, guidelines for implementing the philosophy are sketched:

  1. Taxation is the principal source of funding for the state. To be fair, tax should be progressive and simple and tax liability should arise where wealth is generated.
  2. An active public sector is essential for people and society to flourish. It should be involved in reducing inequality and intervening in markets. The public realm promotes good life choices, which people are free to ignore.
  3. An egalitarian deliberative democracy, at various levels, provides the endorsement needed for public activity, the law and rights.

The intention is to demonstrate that the philosophy is achievable. Non-oppressive taxation, sufficient to fund an active state, is feasible. The public sector is engaged in producing an economic and social environment in which people can flourish.

Much ground is covered in the dissertation, too much to provide a fully developed account. Rather than a single argument, it is a series of arguments unified in support of the thesis. Together, they are intended to show that liberalism has serious defects in both consequences and theory and that a better way is both needed and possible.

© 2018 C P Blundred